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Abstract 
Departing from a critical understanding of the relationship between state, law and 
power, we propose a critical overview of the concept of the state of exception 
developed by Giorgio Agamben. We emphasise the idea that the principle of legal 
exceptionality is not as merely used in response to the current crisis in capitalism, 
but is an enduring and core technique of power used by states to reproduce economic 
and colonial power relations. Thus, this paper offers three core points of departure 
from dominant understandings of the state of exception. First, we urge a rupture of 
the crude opposition between positive law and the state of exception. Second, we 
argue for a rejection of limited Western concept of (liberal, political) rights. Finally, 
we argue for an attention to the materiality of power relations, rather than a narrow 
focus on the power projected by formal institutions of state power.  
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Resumen 
Nuestra aproximación al concepto de estado de excepción desarrollado por Giorgio 
Agamben surge de una comprensión crítica de la relación entre Estado, derecho y 
poder. Hacemos hincapié en que el principio de excepcionalidad jurídica no es 
meramente utilizado en respuesta a la actual crisis capitalista, sino que es una técnica 
de poder central y duradera utilizada por el Estado para reproducir relaciones de 
poder económicas y coloniales. Esta introducción ofrece tres puntos centrales a partir 
de la comprensión dominante del estado de excepción: primero, planteamos una 
ruptura con la oposición cruda entre derecho positivo y estado de excepción; 
segundo, argüimos en favor del rechazo de la concepción limitada occidental (liberal 
y política) de los derechos; finalmente, defendemos prestar atención a la materialidad 
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de las relaciones de poder, más que al énfasis limitado en el poder protegido por las 
instituciones formales del poder estatal.  
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1. Introduction 
The state of exception has become, in the last two decades, a key concept used by 
social and political theorists to explain periods of crisis. Newspapers, media-outlets, 
and online platforms inform us, almost every day, of state of emergency declarations, 
the imposition of exceptional measures or the activation of martial law to deal with 
economic, social, environmental and political crises, or to tackle scenarios of political 
violence. In short, we are witnessing a normalization of a state of exception as a 
technique of political management in contemporary democracies. At the same time, 
we would argue that the conceptualisation of the state of exception remains 
underdeveloped. The concept has been narrowly understood as a process in which 
the suspension of the rule of law and certain constitutional guarantees by the 
sovereign, have the intention of normalising an “emergency situation” that 
“threatens” the constitution and/or the normal function of the legal system. Political 
violence, revolution and riots, the refugee crisis and natural disasters have been the 
dominant focus of state of exception analyses in the socio-legal and philosophic-
political traditions.  
As we will argue in this introduction, the dominant intellectual perspective of the state 
of exception, typified by Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) development of the concept 
remains somewhat reductive and limited in its explanatory capacity. Our contention 
is that, despite the normalization of the state of exception in many jurisdictions (a 
contention of Agamben’s thesis that we agree with), the social-legal, political and 
economic effects of its implementation remains undertheorized. Even more so, the 
effects of the state of exception on the people who suffer its implementation most – 
those whose Benjamin (2006) named, in his Theses VIII, “the tradition of the 
oppressed” – represents an important gap in the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between exceptionality, law and political economy. In this sense, this special issue 
aims to expand our understanding of the dispositive of the state of exception in the 
current socio-legal, political and economic global context.1 To do so, it explores the 
basis of a new epistemological approach in socio-legal studies. This epistemological 
approach refines Agamben’s analysis and systemises the connection between 
sovereignty, emergency laws and economy.  
The special issue thus sets out new ways of thinking about the challenges facing the 
development of law and quasi-legal mechanism in connection to economic 
development, democratic governance, corporate power and political mobilisation in 
the current period. The articles in this special issue aim to disentangle the concept of 
the state of exception, as well as to portray its entwined relationship with economic 
and political dominations. At the same time, it seeks to place the history and 
experiences of those who suffer the most in the face of the exceptional techniques of 
state power at the core of its reflection.  
2. States of Exception 
In two seminal studies, Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) demonstrated that the state 
of exception has ceased to be a dispositive of administration in exceptional situations 
and has become a routinised dispositive of governmentality, involving a more integral 
process of social ordering in contemporary Western societies. States of exception are 
those situations that enable the state/sovereign to invoke the right to suspend the 
normal rule of law. Normally this occurs under conditions of a declared national 
emergency involving a security crisis or challenge to the integrity of the state 
(whether real or imagined). For Agamben, the state of exception represents 
something fundamental to state power. Starting from this point Agamben shows how 
the state of exception has become an almost permanent condition in the most 
powerful and advanced Global North states. Rather than being understood as 
                                                 
1 This special issue is based on papers first presented in the workshop State of Exception, Law and 
Economy: A socio-legal approach to the economic of exception in an era of crisis held at the International 
Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati, the Basque Country, on the 2nd and 3rd of June, 2016. 
José Atiles-Osoria and David Whyte   State of Exception, Law and… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 8, n. 6 (2018), 808-818 
ISSN: 2079-5971 812 
aberrations or the extremes at the margins of state power, the worst excesses of 
arbitrary state power (e.g., Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) represent the latest 
manifestations of an ever-present core of state/law/power. In other forms of political 
and legal governance, the state of exception has visibly become the norm.  
The state of exception is not merely a result of bad government, or a pathological 
condition, but, is [following Schmitt’s (2005) famous statement that the sovereign is 
“he who decides on the state of exception”] the very foundation of state sovereignty. 
A key aspect of sovereign power that his analysis reveals is the relation between the 
sovereign and its ability to reproduce the space between law and non-law in which a 
“secret solidarity between law and anomie” is revealed. There are similarities here 
with Naomi Klein’s (2007) analysis in The Shock Doctrine in the sense that the 
deliberate creation of chaos is intended to shock a subjugated population into 
compliance with extreme economic measures. Others have shown that the state of 
exception works as the legal framework for legitimating corruption and plundering.2  
For Agamben, therefore, the state of exception represents something fundamental 
to state power. And it is the intensification of the form that exception takes in 
contemporary states that reveals something about both the structure of the law and 
the limits of legal authority. The state of exception normally occurs under the guise 
of necessity. Agamben argues that the concept of necessity – derived directly from 
Carl Schmitt (2005)– is the figure that enables the state of exception to appear “as 
an ‘illegal’ but perfectly ‘juridical and constitutional’ measure that is realised in the 
production of new norms (or of a new juridical order)” [Agamben 2005, 28]. As 
Hannah Arendt (1977) noted in the context of the Third Reich, suspension of the law 
is generally justified using a principle of raison d’etat (literally, “reason of state” which 
is normally equated to the national interest); an overriding concern that requires the 
state to use extreme means to defend its integrity. For Agamben, the US detention 
centres of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo represent the highest stage of development 
of the state of exception, and rather than being understood as extremes of state 
power, they portray the most recent manifestations of an ever-present core of 
state/law/power. The state of exception that is so clearly discernible at Abu Ghraib 
and Guantanamo therefore acts as a kind of hidden matrix that we can use to chart 
the course of contemporary politics. 
The camp, for Agamben, represents a geopolitical dimension of power.3 Rather than 
merely being understood as an aberration or extreme at the margins of state practice, 
the camp represents the violent structure of geopolitical power that the paradigm of 
the state of exception now adopts. The ontological approach adopted by Agamben is 
significant here, for he argues that the camp should be interpreted in terms of what 
it tells us about the structure of state power, rather than what it tells us about a 
specific empirical moment: 
Instead of deducing the definition of the camp from the events that took place there, 
we will ask: What is a camp, what is its juridico-political structure, that such events 
could take place there? This will lead us to regard the camp, not as a historical fact 
and an anomaly belonging to the past (even if still verifiable) but in some way as the 
hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are still living (Agamben 
1998, 166)  
For Agamben, the state of exception, embodied in the camp, represents the core of 
state power; the spacial/geopolitical foundation of its sovereignty. This is something 
very different from a Weberian understanding of state sovereignty – as founded on 
                                                 
2 See for example: Whyte’s (2010) analysis of the Iraq invasion; Mattei’s (2010) analysis of international 
law and legitimation of plundering of recourses in the Global South; Klein’s (2007) analysis of Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans; and Atiles’ (forthcoming 2018) analysis of the state of exception and Hurricane 
Maria in Puerto Rico.  
3 By the camp, Agamben is referring to a space of anomie where civil liberties are erased, and martial law 
imposed, such as: the Nazi concentration camps, the US detention centres of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, 
but also, the British colonial concentration camps in Kenya as described by Thiong’o (2011, 2013), or the 
Palestinian refugee camps described by Reynolds (2017). 
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the exclusive claim to legitimate violence within a constitutionally or legally 
recognised territory. For Agamben it is not merely the ability to deploy violence, but 
the rather the ability to impose a particular form-of-law (exception) that denotes 
sovereign authority. The imposition of this sovereign authority can be inside or 
outside the rule of law. From this perspective, the relationship between states and a 
particular rule of law therefore cannot be defined easily; the state of exception exists 
neither as a lawful space nor as a space of complete lawlessness. Rather a state of 
exception exists in an indeterminate space or zone of indistinction somewhere 
between law (in so far as a sovereign authority issues a degree or order that is, by 
virtue of the fact it has been made by the sovereign, claims a legal source) and non-
law (in so far as the normal rule of law, or the normal rules of legal procedure have 
been suspended or erased). The ability of the sovereign to reproduce the space 
between law and non-law is a moment in which a “secret solidarity between anomie 
and law” is revealed (Agamben 2005, 71). Power is thus extended through anomic 
conjunctures in a given state/social system; indeed power is applied through the 
deliberate creation of anomie. 
While the camp portrays the normalisation of geopolitical power and its philosophical, 
political, and legal redefinition of contemporary democracies, these zones of anomie, 
also produce a paradigmatic form-of-life, or a biopolitical dimension. In Homo Sacer, 
Foucault’s influence is made explicit in a passage that regrets that lack of 
development of his idea of the “political double bind”. Here, Agamben (1998) argues 
that what is needed to elaborate our understanding of the state is a development of 
the interrelation between (objectivising) political techniques and (subjectivising) 
technologies of the self – a consistent theme in Foucault’s centring of a concept of 
bio-politics. For Agamben it is in the convergence of those realms of power that allows 
us to get closer to understanding the originary structure of state sovereignty. In order 
to unlock this basic structure of sovereignty, he seeks to identify a “unitary center in 
which the political ‘double bind’ finds its raison d’etre” (Agamben 1998, 6). Ultimately 
this unitary centre appears as a convergence of “bare” or “naked” life (a life reduced 
to biological existence without the protection of political status, rights or citizenship) 
and sovereign power. As this process of convergence unfolds, the state of exception 
collapses any formal segregation between the individual and the rule of law. In short, 
bare life is a form-of-life that has been abandoned to the violence of law.  
Although Agamben does not develop in detail an analysis of how this is achieved, 
others adopting a similar approach have. The state of exception, as Aradau (2007) 
has noted, represents a fundamental shift in the political structure; namely the 
collapse of law into nomos (the practical requirements necessary to control the space 
in which legal decisions are taken). Thus, one feature of a state of exception is that 
the legal authority to take decisions is transferred from political fora to administrative 
or bureaucratic officials. This is what Butler (2003) has called “governmentality”, 
and/or “the technification of the politics”. In Guantanamo, for example, the law 
functions through the bureaucracy and administrative practices of the prison itself. 
Key decisions about prisoners or migrants, or any other subject population and how 
they are to be processed, no longer emanate from legislatures or direct political 
decisions, but are made by technicians. What happens is that such technically 
oriented forms of control (which we understand as always political) respond to a 
particular space according to the requirements of the specific situation, rather than 
according to any political or legal command. The implications of this transformation 
are that law imposed by the state of exception is administrative, lacks democratic 
accountability and is arbitrary and reactionary (Aradau 2007, 496-497). Therefore, 
the uses of the state of exception create the condition for the depoliticization of 
politics and it repoliticization into mere technical issues that can be addressed without 
democratic or public debates. In short, the state of exception has become the legal 
form of the neoliberal rationality. 
To sum up the discussion so far, we understand the contribution that Agamben makes 
in his development of the concept of the state of exception significantly extends our 
José Atiles-Osoria and David Whyte   State of Exception, Law and… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 8, n. 6 (2018), 808-818 
ISSN: 2079-5971 814 
understanding of the co-ordinates of state power beyond the traditional relationship 
between of law, power, and sovereignty. Indeed, his work develops a complex, two-
dimensional, manifestation of state/law/power in contemporary politics. On the one 
hand, a geopolitical dimension expressed through the paradigm of the camp; and, 
on the other hand, the biopolitical dimension expressed through the paradigm of the 
bare life. However, as we pointed out above, in this special issue, we are interested 
in proposing a third dimension ignored by Agamben, but present in Schmitt (2003), 
that is, the economic dimension of the exceptionality. It is to this third dimension 
that we now seek to open in the following discussion. 
3. A Narrow Conception of State and Law 
Agamben criticises anarchist and Marxist critiques of the state for their failure to 
recognise the originary structure of state authority and power. Thus, the theory of 
the State “is the reef on which the revolutions of our century have been shipwrecked” 
(Agamben 1998, 12). Yet Agamben’s conceptualisation of the state is narrow and 
incomplete for different reasons: it relies on a formalist understanding of legal and 
political power. Agamben’s fixation with formal process means he is unable to 
adequately conceptualise the wider dynamics of state power and sovereignty that 
exist beyond the status ascribed to individuals, or the status ascribed to a particular 
juncture in the legal order. In order to develop this critique further we set out three 
points below in which Agamben’s theory of the state appears somewhat formalist.  
First, the power struggle he analyses is a legal one: the opposition between positive 
law and the state of exception (which constitutes the undermining of positive law). 
This is indicated in his consistent argument that state of exception corresponds to a 
shift in law, from a constitutionally founded civil/criminal legal order to a martial 
order. Thus, the state of exception that appears in Agamben’s work is narrowly 
concerned with the repressive apparatuses of the state. As a consequence, the rule 
of law in this formulation is understood in negative, or controlling terms, rather than 
positive or productive terms (Lemke 2005); as a process of social control rather than 
social ordering. In doing so, the real social relationships that structure, and are 
reinforced by, legal relations, are obscured by a concept of a state of exception that 
fails to constitute human lives in terms of their economic and social reproduction.  
For example, racial equality might be formally guaranteed by law, but at the same 
time is undermined by the real material relations experienced by people of colour in 
materially unequal societies.4 As Mbembe (2003) remains us, Agamben ignores the 
life experiences of those bodies to whom necropolitics and violence constitute the 
norm. Thus, Agamben is overly concerned with a liberal concept of rights which 
privileges formal political and civil rights over and above the limits that economic or 
social dimensions impose upon rights. Agamben’s concern with legal ordering leads 
to an unnecessary disguising of socio-economic ordering (Whyte 2009). In short, as 
Reynolds (2017) reminds us, the state of exception is always applied in racialized 
forms. 
The consequence of Agamben’s formalism is that law, or the status ascribed by law 
to people, becomes the determining factor in structuring power relations. However, 
although law is key in reproducing inequalities, it is not the origin of those 
inequalities. Ultimately law reproduces inequalities by supporting power relations that 
are fundamentally determined as unequal through social (as opposed to legal) 
relations: through land and property ownership, through the working relationships, 
through patterns of accumulation and consumption, and so on.  
Second, the concept of the state of exception as articulated by Agamben is always 
rooted in a Western idea of rights. Yet in colonial contexts, the state of exception 
typically takes a rather different form than the imposition of a biopolitics that 
eradicates human rights or civil liberties. The early colonial regimes, after all, never 
                                                 
4 For an analysis on these lines see Weheliye (2014). 
José Atiles and David Whyte   State of Exception, Law and… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 8, n. 6 (2018), 808-818 
ISSN: 2079-5971 815 
afforded any such liberties to indigenous peoples. Yet as Stephen Morton (2013) has 
shown, a key manifestation of the state of exception can be found in the European 
colonies and not necessarily in Global North states or, as Agamben would argue, in 
the continuity between Roman Empire and European statehood. Therefore, in 
contradistinction to Agamben, we argue that the colonial origins of the state of 
exception are present in its everyday applications on the Global North.5 Hence, 
legitimate authority for the expansion of the British and US Empires in their earliest 
moments was provided by the demarcation of a notional line between the 
inside/civilised notion of self and the outside/savage notion of self (Venator-Santiago 
2006, Santos 2007). As long as the Native American or African was on the other side 
of the divide, theft of land, brutalisation and genocide could be legitimate. Boiled 
down to its most simple logic, otherness or being outside of our civilisation justified 
– in law and in practice – the most extreme measures of violence and expropriation.  
A third point of critique that also stems from this overbearing concern with legal 
rather than socio-economic ordering, identifies a tendency in Agamben’s work to limit 
his scope of analysis to the formal institutions of state power. Thus, there is a 
tendency to reduce the business of the state to the institutions that are formally 
public. Markets and market institutions such as corporations are seen as formally 
separate and outside the state. The danger here is that we reproduce a reductionist 
view of power in which the relationship between states and capital is simplistically be 
defined in terms of their antagonistic or external positioning against each other 
(Tombs and Whyte 2009). Yet late capitalism is marked by a close interdependence 
of state institutions and corporations. This does not mean that the extent to which 
“public” and “private” sectors exists as (formally) institutionally distinct is not 
important. But it does mean that a concept of the state that does not consider the 
place of capital is likely to miss a great deal in its consideration of state sovereignty. 
Namely, it is likely to miss what the state of exception means for economic actors 
(investors, corporations, people “domiciled” in tax havens etc.).  
The common questions that those three points raise is: where does the state of 
exception fit into regimes of capital accumulation (both colonial/Global South and 
domestic/Global North)? And how might we understand contemporary forms of 
colonial and economic power as connected to exceptional legal power. Our contention 
is not that those three points of critique provide reason to invalidate the general 
approach taken by Agamben. Rather, we see the state of exception as a powerful 
theoretical tool that can be adapted as a useful means for understanding the 
relationship between law, economics and sovereignty in the neoliberal era.  
Indeed, some preliminary work has been mapped out along those lines (i.e. Ong 
2006, Venator-Santiago 2006, Whyte 2009, 2010, Reynolds 2012, Atiles 2016, 
2018). The concept of state of exception has been applied by a number of 
commentators – to understanding government responses to the economic crisis 
(Lazzarato 2013) –. It is also significant in this respect that Schmitt (2003) coined 
the term “economic-fiscal state of emergency” to refer to the implementation of this 
dispositive in the context of economic crises. Benjamin (2006) was well aware of the 
implication of those uses of exceptionality, when he pointed out that the state of 
exception is the norm for the tradition of the oppressed. The oppressed named by 
Benjamin were those who suffered economic and social subjugation, not merely those 
who suffered formal political repression.  
This special issue deals with these scenarios of legal, sociological, economic and 
philosophic-political challenges imposed by the state of exception as a strategy of 
governmentality in the local and global political and economic arena. The contributors 
to this special issue utilise a range of disciplinary epistemological and methodological 
                                                 
5 This is precisely what Césaire (2000) named as the boomerang effect of colonialism and racism. That is, 
racial and colonial violence was first implemented in the Global South and then return to Europe and the 
Global North in the form of fascism and totalitarianism.  
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approaches to develop a perspective that brings the concept of the state of exception 
to the process of understanding the legal ordering of contemporary capitalism. This 
is an application of the concept that has hitherto been neglected in socio-legal 
analysis.  
4. The Special Issue 
This special issue is divided into three major sub-topics: the colonial state of 
exception (articles by Atiles, Rodríguez-Maeso, Coleman); the economic state of 
exception (articles by Rojas and Bernat); and, corporate exceptionalism (articles by 
Whyte, and Ciocchini and Khoury), each sub-topic providing a distinctive space for 
debating and focus discussion on the implications of, and possible solutions to, the 
problems posed by the economy of exception.  
Thus, articles by Atiles, Rodríguez-Maeso and Coleman deal with the theoretical and 
historical analysis of the state of exception in three different contexts of colonial rule. 
Together they articulate a deep analysis of the legal, political history and 
constitutional precedents of the development of state of exception in Western 
countries’ colonial projects. Those articles tackle case studies on US-Puerto Rico, 
European anti-racist policies and corporate violence in Latin America. Articles by 
Rojas and Bernat show how the state of exception had become a legal dispositive of 
economic development that instead of promoting just development has led to 
impoverishment of societies and of their legal, economic and political systems. 
Together, those articles reveal the connections between the state of exception and 
neoliberalism in the context of the current economic crisis and how the state of 
exception is central to the development of economic development and poverty 
policies. Cases that will be analysed here include the brutal assault on Southern 
European countries in the name of neoliberal austerity, and the continuum of state 
violence to secure an economic order in Colombia that was underpinned by an 
unremitting resort to exceptional powers. Whyte provides an overview of how the 
concept of the ‘corporate citizen’ can illuminate a series of exceptional political and 
legal interventions that at the same time masks class power and secures the 
economic dominance of a narrow elite, whilst Ciocchini and Khoury show that the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism used in bilateral treaties acts as an 
exceptional set of rules to neutralise major conflicts around corporate violence. 
As a result, this special issue constitutes a unique effort to illuminate what has been 
forgotten and has remained invisible in the state of exception literature. The special 
issue aims to rethink the state of exception from below, from the place of those 
whose lives have been affected by both the economic crises and exceptionality.  
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